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Abstract. In the present paper we overlay boolean game with norms. Norms
distinguish illegal strategies from legal strategies. Two types of legal strategy and
legal Nash equilibrium are defined. These two equilibrium are viewed as solution
concepts for law abiding agents in norm augmented boolean games. Our formal
model is a combination of boolean games and so called input/output logic. We
study various complexity issues related to legal strategy and legal Nash equilib-
rium.
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1 Introduction
The study of the interplay of games and norms can be divided into two main branches:
the first, mostly originating from economics and game theory [9, 19, 20], treats norms
as mechanisms that enforce desirable properties of social interactions; the second, that
has its roots in social sciences and evolutionary game theory [31, 10] views norms as
(Nash or correlated) equilibrium that result from the interaction of rational agents. A
survey of the interaction between games and norms can be found in Grossi et al [15].
This paper belongs to the first branch.
In this paper we study the combination of boolean games and norms. Boolean game
is a class of games based on propositional logic. It was firstly introduced by Harrenstein
et al. [17] and further developed by several researchers [16, 23, 11, 8, 6, 25]. In a boolean
game, each agent i is assumed to have a goal, represented by a propositional formula
φi over some set of propositional variables P. Each agent i is associated with some
subset Pi of the variables, which are under the unique control of agent i. The choices,
or strategies, available to i correspond to all the possible assignment of truth or falsity
to the variables in Pi. An agent will try to choose an assignment so as to satisfy his goal
φi. Strategic concerns arise because whether i’s goal is in fact satisfied will depend on
the choices made by other agents.
Norms regulate agents’ behaviors in boolean games. Shoham and Tennenholtz’s
early work on behavior change under norms [27, 28] has considered only a relatively
simple view of norms, where some actions or states are designated as violations. Alechina
et al [1] studies how conditional norms regulate agents’ behaviors, but permissive norms
plays no role in their framework. In this paper we study how agents’ behavior are
changed by permissive and obligatory conditional norms. Norms distinguish illegal
strategies from legal strategies. By designing norms appropriately, non-optimal equi-
librium might be avoided. To represent norms in boolean games we need a logic of
norms, which has been extensively studied in the deontic logic community.
Various deontic logic have been developed since von Wright’s first paper [32] in this
area. In the first volume of the handbook of deontic logic [12], input/output logic [21,
22] appears as one of the new achievements in deontic logic in this century. Input/output
logic takes its origin in the study of conditional norms. The basic idea is: norms are con-
ceived as a deductive machine, like a black box which produces normative statements
as output, when we feed it factual statements as input.
In this paper we use input/output logic as the logic of norms. Given a normative
multi-agent system, which contains a boolean game, a set of norms and certain envi-
ronment. Every strategy of every agent is classified as legal or illegal. Notions like legal
Nash equilibrium are then naturally defined.
The structure of this paper is the following: We present some background knowl-
edge, including boolean game, input/output logic and complexity theory in Section 2.
Normative multi-agent system are introduced and its complexity issues are discussed in
Section 3. We conclude this paper in Section 4.
2 Background
2.1 Propositional logic
Let P = {p0, p1, . . .} be a finite set of propositional variables and let LP be the propo-
sitional language built from P and boolean constants > (true) and ⊥ (false) with the
usual connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and↔. Formulas of LP are denoted by φ, ψ etc. A literal
is a variable p ∈ P or its negation. 2P is the set of the valuations for P, with the usual
convention that for V ∈ 2P and p ∈ V , V gives the value true to p if p ∈ V and false
otherwise.  denotes the classical logical consequence relation.
Let X ⊆ P, 2X is the set of X-valuations. A partial valuation (for P) is an X-
valuation for some X ⊆ P. Partial valuations are denoted by listing all variables of
X , with a “ + ” symbol when the variable is set to be true and a “ − ” symbol when
the variable is set to be false: for instance, let X = {p, q, r}, then the X-valuation
V = {p, r} is denoted {+p,−q,+r}. If {P1, . . . ,Pn} is a partition of P and V1, . . . , Vn
are partial valuations, where Vi ∈ 2Pi , (V1, . . . , Vn) denotes the valuation V1∪ . . .∪Vn.
2.2 Boolean game
Boolean games introduced by Harrenstein et al [17] are zero-sum games with two play-
ers, where the strategies available to each player consist in assigning a truth value to
each variable in a given subset of P. Bonzon et al [7] give a more general definition of
a boolean game with any number of players and not necessarily zero-sum. In this paper
we further generalizes boolean games such that the utility of each agent is not neces-
sarily in {0, 1}. Such generalization is reached by representing the goals of each agent
as a set of weighted formulas. The idea of using weighted formulas to define utility can
be found in many work among which we mention satisfiability games [4] and weighted
boolean formula games [23].
Definition 1 (boolean game). A boolean game is a 4-tuple (Agent,P, pi,Goal), where
1. Agent = {1, . . . , n} is a set of agents.
2. P is a finite set of propositional variables.
3. pi : Agent 7→ 2P is a control assignment function such that {pi(1), . . . , pi(n)} forms
a partition of P. For each agent i, 2pi(i) is the strategy space of i.
4. Goal = {Goal1, . . . , Goaln} is a set of weighted formulas of LP. That is, each
Goali is a finite set {〈φ1,m1〉, . . . , 〈φk,mk〉} where φj ∈ LP and mj is a real
number.
A strategy for agent i is a partial valuation for all the variables i controls. Note that
since {pi(1), . . . , pi(n)} forms a partition of P, a strategy profile S is a valuation for P. In
the rest of the paper we make use of the following notation, which is standard in game
theory. Let G = (Agent,P, pi,Goal) be a boolean game with Agent = {1, . . . , n},
S = (s1, . . . , sn) be a strategy profile. s−i denotes the projection of S on Agent−{i}:
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn).
Agents’ utilities in boolean games are induced by their goals. For every agent i and
every strategy profiles S, ui(S) = Σ{mj : 〈φj ,mj〉 ∈ Goali, S  φj}. Dominating
strategies and pure-strategy Nash equilibria are defined as usual in game theory [24].
Example 1 Let G = (Agent,P, pi,Goal) where Agent = {1, 2}, P = {p, q, s},
pi(1) = {p}, pi(2) = {q, s},Goal1 = {〈p↔ q, 1〉, 〈s, 2〉},Goal2 = {〈p∧q, 2〉, 〈¬s, 1〉}.
This boolean game is depicted as follows:
+q,+s +q,−s −q,+s −q,−s
+p (3, 2) (1, 3) (2, 0) (0, 1)
−p (2, 0) (0, 1) (3, 0) (1, 1)
2.3 Input/output logic
In input/output logic, a norm is an ordered pair of formulas (φ, ψ) ∈ LP × LP. There
are two types of norms which are used in input/output logic, obligatory norms and
permissive norms. Let N = O ∪ P be a set of obligatory and permissive norms. A pair
(φ, ψ) ∈ O, call it an obligatory norm, is read as “given φ, it is obligatory to be ψ”. A
pair (φ, ψ) ∈ P , call it a permissive norm, is read as “given φ, it is permitted to be ψ”.
Obligatory norms O can be viewed as a function from 2LP to 2LP such that for a set
Φ of formulas, O(Φ) = {ψ ∈ LP : (φ, ψ) ∈ O for some φ ∈ Φ}.
Definition 2 (Semantics of input/output logic [21]). Given a finite set of obligatory
norms O and a finite set of formulas Φ, out(O,Φ) = Cn(O(Cn(Φ))), where Cn is the
consequence relation of propositional logic.1
1 In Makinson and van der Torre [21], this logic is called simple-minded input/output logic.
Different input/output logics are developed in Makinson and van der Torre [21] as well. A
technical introduction of input/output logic can be found in Sun [30].
Intuitively, the procedure of the semantics is as following: We first have in hand a set
of formulas Φ (call it the input) as a description of the current state. We then close it by
logical consequence Cn(Φ). The set of norms, like a deductive machine, accepts this
logically closed set and produces a set of formulasO(Cn(Φ)). We finally get the output
Cn(O(Cn(Φ))) by applying the logical closure again. ψ ∈ out(O,φ) is understood as
“ψ is obligatory given facts Φ and norms O”.
Example 2 Let p, q, r are propositional variables. Let O = {(p, q), (p ∨ q, r), (r, p)}.
Then out(O, {p}) = Cn(O(Cn({p}))) = Cn({q, r}). 
Input/output logic is given a proof theoretic characterization. We say that an ordered
pair of formulas is derivable from a set O iff (a, x) is in the least set that extends
O ∪ {(>,>)} and is closed under a number of derivation rules. The following are the
rules we need:
– SI (strengthening the input): from (φ, ψ) to (χ, ψ) whenever χ  φ.
– WO (weakening the output): from (φ, ψ) to (φ, χ) whenever ψ  χ.
– AND (conjunction of output): from (φ, ψ) and (φ, χ) to (φ, ψ ∧ χ).
The derivation system based on the rules SI, WO and AND is denoted as deriv(O).
Example 3 Let O = {(p∨ q, r), (q, r → s)}, then (q, s) ∈ deriv(O) because we have
the following derivation
1. (p ∨ q, r) Assumption
2. (q, r) 1, SI
3. (q, r → s) Assumption
4. (q, r ∧ (r → s)) 2,3, AND
5. (q, s) 4, WO
In Makinson and van der Torre [21], the following soundness and completeness
theorem is proved:
Theorem 1 ([21]). Given a set of obligatory norms O,
ψ ∈ out(O, {φ}) iff (φ, ψ) ∈ deriv(O).
Permission in input/output logic Philosophically, it is common to distinguish be-
tween two kinds of permission: negative permission and positive permission. Negative
permission is straightforward to describe: something is negatively permitted according
to certain norms iff it is not prohibited by those norms. That is, iff there is no obligation
to the contrary. Positive permission is more elusive. Makinson and van der Torre [22]
distinguish two types of positive permission: static and dynamic permission. For the
sake of simplicity, in this paper when discuss positive permission we only mean static
permission.
Definition 3 (negative permission [22]). Given a finite set of norms N = O ∪ P and
a finite set of formulas Φ, NegPerm(N,Φ) = {ψ ∈ LP : ¬ψ 6∈ out(O,Φ)}.
Intuitively, φ is negatively permitted iff φ is not forbidden. Since a formula is forbid-
den iff its negation is obligatory, φ is not forbidden is equivalent to ¬φ is not obligatory.
Permissive norms plays no role in negative permission.
Definition 4 (positive permission [22]). Given a finite set of formulas Φ, a finite set of
norms N = O ∪ P where O is a set of obligatory norms and P is a set of permissive
norms.
– If P 6= ∅, then PosPerm(N,Φ) = {ψ ∈ LP : ψ ∈ out(O ∪ {(φ′, ψ′)}, Φ),
for some (φ′, ψ′) ∈ P}}.
– If P = ∅, then PosPerm(N,Φ) = out(O,Φ).
Intuitively, permissive norms are treated like weak obligatory norms, the basic dif-
ference is that while the latter may be used jointly, the former may only be applied one
by one. As an illustration of such difference, image a situation in which a man is per-
mitted to date either one of two girls, but not both of them. Alternative definitions of
positive permission can be found in Makinson and van der Torre [22], Stolpe [29] and
Governatori [14].
2.4 Complexity theory
Complexity theory is the theory to investigate the time, memory, or other resources
required for solving computational problems. In this subsection we briefly review those
concepts and results from complexity theory which will be used in this paper. More
comprehensive introduction of complexity theory can be found in [3]
We assume the readers are familiar with notions like Turing machine and the com-
plexity class P, NP and coNP. Oracle Turing machine and two complexity classes related
to oracle Turing machine will be used in this paper.
Definition 5 (oracle Turing machine [3]). An oracle for a language L is a device that
is capable of reporting whether any string w is a member of L. An oracle Truing ma-
chine ML is a modified Turing machine that has the additional capability of querying
an oracle. WheneverML writes a string on a special oracle tape it is informed whether
that string is a member of L, in a single computation step.
PNP is the class of problems solvable by a deterministic polynomial time Tur-
ing machine with an NP oracle. NPNP is the class of problems solvable by a non-
deterministic polynomial time Turing machine with an NP oracle. Another name for
the class NPNP is Σp2 . Σ
p
i+1 is the class of problems solvable by a non-deterministic
polynomial time Turing machine with aΣpi oracle.Π
p
i is the class of problems of which
the complement is in Σpi .
3 From boolean game to normative multi-agent system
In recent years, normative multi-agent system [5, 2] arises as a new interdisciplinary
academic area bringing together researchers from multi-agent system [26, 34, 33], de-
ontic logic [12] and normative system [13, 18, 1]. By combining boolean games and
norms, we here develop a new approach for normative multi-agent system.
Definition 6 (normative multi-agent system). A normative multi-agent system is a
triple (G,N,E) where
– G = (Agent,P, pi,Goal) is a boolean game.
– N = O ∪ P ⊆ LP × LP is a finite set of obligatory and permissive norms.
– E ⊆ LP is a finite set of formulas representing the environment.
3.1 Legal strategy
In a normative multi-agent system, agent’s strategies are classified as either legal or
illegal. The basic idea is viewing strategies as formulas and using the mechanism of
input/output logic to decide whether a formula is permitted.
Definition 7 (legal strategy). Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E) where
N = O ∪ P , for each agent i, a strategy (+p1, . . . ,+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn) is negatively
legal if
p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn ∈ NegPerm(N,E).
The strategy is positively legal if
p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qn ∈ PosPerm(N,E).
Example 4 Consider the prisoner’s dilemma augmented with norms, where the two
prisoners are brothers who are morally required to protect each other. Let (G,N,E)
be a normative multi-agent system as following:
– G = (Agent,P, pi,Goal) is a boolean game with
• Agent = {1, 2},
• P = {p, q},
• pi(1) = {p}, pi(2) = {q},
• Goal1 = {〈p, 2〉, 〈¬q, 3〉}, Goal2 = {〈q, 2〉, 〈¬p, 3〉}.
– N = O ∪ P where O = {(>,¬p)}, P = {(>,¬q)}.
– E = ∅.
+q −q
+p (2, 2) (5, 0)
−p (0, 5) (3, 3)
Then out(O,E) = Cn({¬p}), {¬p, q,¬q} ⊆ NegPerm(N,E). Therefore {−p},
{+q}, {−q} are negatively legal while {+p} is not. Moreover we havePosPerm(N,E) =
out(O ∪ P,E) = Cn({¬p,¬q}), Therefore {−p} and {−q} are positively legal while
neither {+p} nor {+q} is. a
Having defined notions of legal strategy. A natural question to ask is how complex
is it to decide whether a strategy is legal. The following theorems give a first answer to
this question.
Theorem 2. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E) and a strategy (+p1, . . . ,
+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn), deciding whether this strategy is negatively legal is NP complete.
Proof. Concerning the NP hardness, we prove by reducing the satisfiability problem of
propositional logic to our problem: Let φ ∈ LP be a formula. Let N = {(¬φ,¬p)},
E = ∅. Then p ∈ NegPerm(N,E) iff ¬p 6∈ out(N,E) = Cn(N(Cn(E))) =
Cn(N(Cn(>))) iff 6 ¬φ iff φ is satisfiable.
Now we prove the NP membership. We provide the following non-deterministic
Turing machine to solve our problem. Let N = {(φ1, ψ1), . . . , (φn, ψn)}, E be a finite
set of formulas and p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qk be a formula.
1. Guess a sequence of valuation V1, . . . , Vn, V ′ on the propositional letters appears
in E ∪ {φ1, . . . , φn} ∪ {ψ1, . . . , ψn} ∪ {p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qk}.
2. Let N ′ ⊆ N be the set of obligatory norms which contains all (φi, ψi) such that
Vi(E) = 1 and Vi(φi) = 0.
3. Let Ψ = {ψ : (φ, ψ) ∈ N −N ′}.
4. If V ′(Ψ) = 1 and V ′(p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qk) = 0. Then return “accept”
on this branch. Otherwise return “reject” on this branch.
It can be verified that p1 ∧ . . . ∧ pm ∧ ¬q1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬qk 6∈ Cn(N(Cn(E))) iff
the algorithm returns “accept” on some branch and the time complexity of the non-
deterministic Turing machine is polynomial. a
Theorem 3. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E) and a strategy (+p1, . . . ,
+pm,−q1, . . . ,−qn), deciding whether this strategy is positively legal is coNP com-
plete.
Proof. The coNP hardness can be proved by a reduction from the tautology problem of
propositional logic. Here we omit the details.
Concerning the coNP membership, note thatPosPerm(N,E) = out(O∪{(φ1, ψ1)}
, E)∪. . .∪out(O∪{(φm, ψm)}, E), whereN = O∪P ,P = {(φ1, ψ1), . . . , (φm, ψm)}.
The NP membership follows from the fact that the NP class is closed under union. a
3.2 Legal Nash equilibrium
A (pure-strategy) legal Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile which contains only legal
strategies and no agent can improve his utility by choosing another legal strategy, given
others do not change their strategies.
Definition 8 (Legal Nash equilibrium). Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E),
A strategy profile S = (s1, . . . , sn) is a negatively legal Nash equilibrium if
– for every agent i, si is a negatively legal strategy
– for every agent i, for every negatively legal strategy s′i ∈ Si, ui(S) ≥ ui(s′i, s−i).
Positively legal Nash equilibrium is defined analogously.
Example 5 In the normative multi-agent system presented in Example 4, there is no
negatively legal Nash equilibrium and (−p,−q) is the unique positively legal Nash
equilibrium.
Example 6 Let (G,N,E) be a normative system as following:
– G = (Agent,P, pi,Goal) is a boolean game with
• Agent = {1, 2},
• P = {p, q},
• pi(1) = {p}, pi(2) = {q},
• Goal1 = Goal2 = {〈p ∧ q, 2〉, 〈¬p ∧ ¬q, 3〉}.
– N = O ∪ P where O = {(>,¬p), (>,¬q)}, P = ∅.
– E = ∅.
+q −q
+p (2, 2) (0, 0)
−p (0, 0) (3, 3)
Without norms there are two Nash equilibria: (+p,+q) and (−p,−q). There is only
one negatively/positively legal Nash equilibrium: (−p,−q). From the perspective of
social welfare, (+p,+q) is not an optimal equilibrium because its social welfare is 2+
2 = 4, while the social welfare of (−p,−q) is 3+ 3 = 6. Therefore this example shows
that by designing norms appropriately, non-optimal equilibrium might be avoided
Theorem 4. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E) and a strategy profile
S = (s1, . . . , sn). Deciding whether S is a negatively legal Nash equilibrium is NP
hard and in coNPNP .
Proof. (sketch) It is NP hard because deciding whether a single strategy is legal is
already NP hard.
Concerning the coNPNP membership, we prove by giving the following algorithm
on a non-deterministic Turing machine with oracle SAT to solve the complement of
this problem.
1. Test if S is a negatively legal strategy profile. If no, then return “accept”. Otherwise
continue.
2. Guess a strategy profile S′.
3. Test if S′ is a legal strategy profile. If yes, continue. Otherwise return “reject” on
this branch.
4. Test if ui(S) < ui(S′) for some i. If yes, return “accept” on this branch. Otherwise
return “reject” on this branch.
It can be verified that S is NOT a negatively legal Nash equilibrium iff the non-
deterministic Turing returns “accept” on some branches. Therefore deciding whether S
is a negatively legal Nash equilibrium is in coNPNP . a
Theorem 5. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E) and a strategy profile
S = (s1, . . . , sn). Deciding whether S is a positively legal Nash equilibrium of G is
coNP hard and in coNPNP .
Proof. (sketch) Similar to the proof of Theorem 4. a
Theorem 6. Given a normative multi-agent system (G,N,E). Deciding whether there
is a negatively/positively legal Nash equilibrium of G is ΣP2 hard and in Σ
P
3 .
Proof. (sketch) The lower bound follows from the fact that deciding Nash equilibrium
for boolean games without norms is ΣP2 complete [7]. Concerning the upper bound,
recall that ΣP3 = NP
ΣP2 . The problem can be solved by a polynomial time non-
deterministic Turing machine with an ΣP2 oracle. a
4 Conclusion
In the present paper we introduce boolean game with norms. Norms distinguish illegal
strategies from legal strategies. Using ideas from input/output logic, two types of legal
strategies are discussed, as well as two types of legal Nash equilibrium. After formally
presenting the model, we use examples to show that non-optimal Nash equilibrium can
be avoided by implementing norms. We study the complexity issues related to legal
strategy and legal Nash equilibrium.
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